A petition has been moved in the Supreme Court challenging the prohibitory orders issued by the Delhi Police that prohibit five or more people from assembling in certain parts of the city. According to the plea, these orders, passed under the provisions of Section 144 of the CrPC, have caused severe inconveniences to the public and are violative of fundamental rights such as peaceful assembling and free movement in the city.Background: Section 144 and its Use in Delhi Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the executive power to give orders in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger, to prohibit the assembly of five or more persons in an area. It is most oft brought into play in situations of issues of law and order which may include riots or protests, with the intention of trying to prevent it from taking on potential violent channels. However, its misuses by Delhi Police have recently posed an obvious query: Does it prove to be deployed rather too commonly or even redundantly these days?. In this case, the prohibitory orders issued by Delhi Police have led to a blanket ban on mass collection and congregations in some areas. Authorities claim this is necessary to preserve law and order in the public. The petitioner, however, contends that such orders cause turmoil in peoples lives, more so citizens who require collection for peaceful purposes like social events, religious events and community events. The Petition: Violation of Fundamental Rights The petitioner contended that such a blanket order of Section 144 in the absence of any particular reasons runs afoul of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. It is admitted that under Article 19(1)(b) the peaceful assembling right is safeguarded, and under Article 19(1)(d) the right to move freely in any part of the country is conferred on its citizens. According to the plea, indiscriminate use of prohibitory orders under Section 144 is arbitrary and excessive, because such prohibition does not even consider the proportionality of restriction vis-à-vis the threat to law and order alleged in the premises. For instance, the petitioners contend that these orders overwhelmingly affected ordinary citizens since they were disturbing the ability of ordinary citizens to join cultural, social and even private congregations and, therefore, were inconsistent with the fabric of public life. The appeal adds that such extraordinary blanket steps must be resorted only to in recognisably exceptional circumstances rather than being resorted to as a normal tool in the measures to limit crowds . Justification of the Government In response to the plea, the Delhi police has responded that prohibitory orders are only a temporary affair and necessary to maintain peace in the capital, particularly where at any point in time stray incidents begin to go out of control. Such restriction, according to this argument, is in public interest and based on the intelligence inputs regarding any threats the agencies feel. The government argues that the orders are necessary to prevent events that may develop into acts of chaos or violence.
Justice Urmila Joshi Phalke of the Bombay High Court headed the bench that made this landmark judgment and clarified that, under the NDPS Act, the term 'ganja' specifically refers to the flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant, excluding any seeds or leaves. This clarification was issued when admitting an accused person on bail who was charged of carrying a commercial quantity of ganja.Case Background The accused was arrested for transporting an enormous quantity of ganja which is commercially quantified under the NDPS Act. The police recovered ganja from the accused, and this led to invoking charges under the draconian provisions of the Act for which bail became a cumbersome process to be acquired. According to this Act, possession and sale of such drugs in commercial quantities warrant very heavy punishment. The term ganja has consistently been a definition in the Act and the Act has clearly provided that ganja only means the flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant excluding the seeds and leaves. Key Argument The case rested on an argument that whatever was seized comprised parts of the cannabis plant, which includes leaves and seeds, which did not come within the technical definition of ganja under Section 2(iii)(b) of the NDPS Act. They argued that since the seized material consisted of something more than the flowering tops, strict provisions of the NDPS Act related to commercial quantity should not be attracted. Judgement Observation Any seeds or leaves accompanying the balance of the seized material would not be considered ganja under the Act. It was accordingly noted by the court that the prosecution had not established that the seized quantity was entirely composed of flowering tops of the cannabis plant, which, independently, would justify charges under the NDPS Act for commercial quantities. Grant of Bail Justice Phalke observed, The learned counsel for the accused submits that the prosecution has not even been able to establish what the seized material is. That in itself casts considerable doubt over whether the stringent provisions of the NDPS Act have been applied. She concluded that further investigation and in-depth chemical analysis would be necessary to determine whether the substance fell within the definition of ganja in the Act. This case, while very particular, drives the point home to strictly follow the definitions provided by the NDPS Act, especially when cases entail strict penalties. The court's judgment is one such reminder that in cases related to drug-related matters, the prosecution must firmly and correctly establish the nature of substances seized in order to apply the law.
In an important environmental case, the Bombay High Court recently took suo motu cognizance on the alarming levels of garbage dumping along the Mumbai shoreline. Acting suo motu, the court followed up after a study by the Central Fishery Research Institute revealed that there existed the presence of micro-polythene particles in the intestines of fish consumed by humans. This case poses concerns related to the increased marine pollution issues, mainly the extensive negative impacts plastic waste poses on aquatic life and public health.However, during the last two decades, gross waste disposal of the plastic type has harmed the coastline and the marine environment drastically. The problem gained importance after the Central Fishery Research Institute undertook the study to analyze the impact of marine pollution on the fish species in the Arabian Sea. The findings of the study were alarming. It showed that a large percentage of the fishes captured in the waters off the Mumbai coast had micro-polythene particles inside their intestines. The minute plastic fragments originate from rubbish thrown into the sea and are consumed by fish and other seafood, which then enter the food chain for human consumption. The presence of such harmful substances in the fish consumed by humans creates severe risks for public health and raises concerns for long-term health impacts. Court's Suo Motu Action After perusing the findings of the research study, the Bombay High Court took suo motu cognizance of the issue, thereby initiating legal proceedings without requiring a formal petition. It was concerned that such rampant disposal of garbage, especially plastic waste, into the sea caused significant environmental degradation. The court opined that the issue was more than an environmental degradation issue because the problem also raised concerns regarding public health by posing risks to human consumers through contaminated fish. Court's Observations The bench underlined the failure of the civic authorities to manage the wastes generated by the city and called for remedial steps to be taken forthwith. It pointed out that despite numerous environmental enactments, the situation from the shores of Mumbai had deteriorated all through these years with the lax enforcement and the non-accountability of the concerned agencies. That further stressed that the issue also results from citizens irresponsible waste disposal, in this case, plastics, that find their way into the sea. It then called for an all-rounded plan of actions including awareness campaigns with the public and strict implementation of the regulations set for people dealing with waste, as well as a heightened effort by the local authorities in cleaning the shoreline and preventing more pollution. Future Actions and Orders The Bombay High Court directed the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation and other authorities concerned to file a detailed report about the status of garbage management going on along the coastlines of this metropolis. The court requested the steps taken to prevent plastic waste from being discharged into the sea and the measures taken to clear such waste already dumped into the sea. The court has also requested the MPCB to keep an eye on the situation and submit periodical reports to the court about the levels of marine pollution with a special focus on plastic waste. Moreover, it seeks the environment experts from the government side to bring in a long-term strategy to understand how it could curb marine pollution and its ill effects on public health.
The Kerala High Court recently dismissed a plea to quash a rape case against a 59-year-old priest who had allegThe petitioner approached the Kerala High Court for quashing the case since his relationship with the complainant was consensual, and there were no elements of force or deceit involved. In addition to this, he argued that it would amount to an abuse of the process of law, whereas he claimed that the lady was merely attempting to vitiate his reputation. The main argument of the defense was that it could not be criminal for consenting adults to engage in sexual intercourse if a promise previously made by one party to marry was afterwards withdrawn. That apart, the High Court summarily rejected all such contentions holding that in the case before it prima facie evidence had been adduced warranting a trial. It was further observed by the Court that the allegations made by the woman indicated the fact that the priest had indulged in sexual relations with her by making a false promise of marriage which, under the Indian law, amounted to rape. Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code specifically defines rape and considers cases where consent has been acquired under a misconception of fact. In cases of misrepresentation to a woman for sexual activity, where there is a promise of marriage, courts have often held that such consent not being free and voluntary is really a form of deception. The Kerala High Court also ruled that the allegations made by the woman could not be dismissed as trivial and necessitated a proper trial. The court then held that at the stage of quashing a case, the court should not normally regard weight upon any evidence or weigh it, but determine whether the allegations were true or false and whether, on the face of it, the complaint establishes prima facie case against the accused, and in its opinion, the woman's allegations were enough to warrant continuation of the trial.edly promised to marry a woman only to rape her. The case had been initiated after the woman complained that the priest had been having sexual relations with her while under false pretenses of marrying her. He had promised to marry her, but failed to do so, leading her to lodge the complaint that eventually resulted in his prosecution.
In what would be termed a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court of India held that input tax credit (ITC) cannot be claimed on the construction of buildings. The Indian Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Sections 17(5)(c) and (d) and Section 16(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, that curb the availability of ITC on the inputs and services used in the construction of immovable property.In this case, companies involved in real estate and infrastructure development challenged some of the provisions of the CGST Act when those insisted that it was arbitrary and discriminatory to deprive them of ITC in respect of inputs and services used in the construction of buildings or other immovable properties. Section 17(5)(c) and (d) of the CGST Act has explicitly levied not to avail ITC on goods or services used in construction of an immovable property; it does not apply, however, if such property is constructed to sell or likely to be used for business. The petitioners submitted that such a distinction was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, resulting in creating an arbitrariness between those businesses which were allowed to claim ITC and those which were not. On these arguments, the Supreme Court held that the validity of the impugned sections was not affected. It observed that the GST law was framed with the objective of achieving the seamless flow of input tax credit on goods and services consumed in a business, however, the legislation also permitted some exclusions for policy reasons. The Court argued that Section 16(4) of the CGST Act has actually restricted the time available for claiming ITC. Under this provision, an assessee can claim ITC within two years from the date of an invoice. Petitioners approached this provision similarly and argued that it discriminates against long-term construction projects as a guise for its absolute restraint on the time component relating to the availability of ITC. On these grounds, the Supreme Court also allowed the provision, labeling it reasonable and necessary for compliance in time and to prevent tax fraud.
The Delhi High Court has been recently seeking a response from the Delhi Police over the plea by Sonam Wangchuk, a renowned environmentalist and engineer, who demanded permission to stage a dharna at Jantar Mantar. Other protesters have been lobbying for the implementation of the Sixth Schedule for Ladakh as it seeks constitutional special protections for the Union Territory.Led by Wangchuk and other activists, the marchers have walked from Leh to Delhi arguing that Ladakh has peculiar cultural and environmental concerns. He has stated how the lack of such measures may irreversibly damage the fragile Ladakhi environment and traditional way of life, especially in the face of intensifying developmental pressures. The Sixth Schedule has been in effect currently in four northeastern states-Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram-which has offered the regions certain legislative and administrative autonomy to preserve and sustain their distinctive customs and practices. Wangchuk and his fellow activists argue that Ladakh, with such a large tribal population and precarious ecological balance, warrants similar protection as would ensure sustainable development and safeguard indigenous culture in this region. Wangchuk requested to protest peacefully at the Jantar Mantar, a protest venue in the heart of New Delhi, was a response to the permission denied by Delhi Police. Jantar Mantar has been one of those venues for peaceful protest as well as the denial raises large questions about the right to peaceful assembly as it is protected by the Indian Constitution. Responding to this, Wangchuk moved the Delhi High Court for judicial intervention to permit his protest. Delhi High Court while hearing told the Delhi Police to present its response to Wangchuk's plea for permission to carry out the protest. The issue of public safety should not be overlooked, nor should the right to peaceful protest while being reminded by the Court that the right to assemble and raise grievances under Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution is treated as a fundamental right even though some restrictions can be imposed in the interest of public order. Wangchuk's march and his call for Ladakh to be added to the Sixth Schedule has been quite in the headlines, all across the country. The movement more pointedly raised issues regarding the impact of long term strain of tourism and industrialization and infrastructural development on the ecosystem and the very identity of Ladakhi people. Much will, of course depend on the High Court verdict regarding the dharna at Jantar Mantar, not only for Wangchuk's cause but for the greater issue of balancing environmental and cultural preservation with development issues in Ladakh.
The Madras High Court held it significant that merThe question of the case centered on an accused who had money sourced from some alleged illegal undertakings. In this case, the accused attempted to refute the claim that they were engaged in projecting the proceeds as clean, which would always characterize money laundering. Their defense rested upon the argument that they only possessed the money but had not covered the illegal source of its origin, which should not therefore be termed money laundering. Further, the Madras High Court dismissed such an argument and went into a good length of explanation of Section 3 PMLA that defines money laundering. The Court pointed out that the language of the statute is sufficiently broad enough to include not only the act of "laundering" of money but also mere possession of proceeds of crime. According to the Court, in fact possession itself is the punishable offence regardless of whether the person tried to legitimize such tainted assets. The court clarified that section 3 of PMLA criminalises not only the act of projecting the proceeds of crime as untainted property but also possession, use, concealing, or acquiring such proceeds. It is a clear judgment that the possession of proceeds of crime raises an irrebuttable presumption of guilt under the PMLA, and the burden shifts on the accused to prove the legitimacy of his possession. This building broadens the scope of the PMLA-it does not require an individual to have been attempting to clean dirty money for the crime of money laundering to apply. By holding that possession alone is sufficient, the Court clarified that any individual who happens to be in possession of the proceeds of crime, even if they are not attempting directly to conceal its tainted source, are vulnerable to being convicted of money laundering. The Court held that the PMLA is an all-comprehensive legislation to deal with the menace of money laundering in its various manifestations. The intent behind the law appears to be to ensure that anyone associated, directly or indirectly, with criminal activity can be dealt with and brought within its orbit as it lends itself to providing for illegal financial transactions. Thus, maintaining proceeds of crime per se would be considered a constitutive part of money laundering because it enables and supports more illegal activities.e possession of proceeds of crime is enough to invoke provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. Clarifying that under Section 3 of PMLA, both possessing the proceeds of crime and projecting or claiming it to be untainted property could independently qualify as money laundering activities, it delivered the verdict.
The Gujarat government recently defended the demolition of Islamic structures in the state to the Supreme Court, reiterating that the demolitions did not contradict the Supreme Court's earlier judgments or amounts to a deliberate attack on the particular community, under the guise of evacuating encroachments, but still happened to be unlawfuUnluckily for the authorities involved, this demolition was against an earlier order issued by the Supreme Court whereby their orders had stopped the demolitions of the properties of people considered to be engaged in criminal activities without following due process. The court passed this order while preventing arbitrary actions of local authorities against people who were part of protesting and or civil unrest, especially when demolitions were being used as a punitive measure without proper legal recourse. The Gujarat Collector, however clarified in the court that the structures were illegal encrochnments on public land and did not stand in any valid legal light. The Collector underlined that the activity was part of a much larger process whereby encroachments were to be removed across the state, sect aside. The government had argued that proper notices were issued before demolitions and due process was maintained. In the supporting affidavit presented, it has been contended that the structures pulled down do not have any authorization, and therefore the pulling them down does not violate any of the Supreme Court's orders. The state had pleaded that the structures needed to be cleared for reasons of public safety and to restore order since they obstruct public spaces such as roads and pathways. Furthermore, the Collector dismissed allegations that the demolitions were targeted or carried out with communal bias, stating they were part of a legal and routine exercise to clear encroachments in all parts of the state. The government further advanced the argument that religious discrimination could never be the ground of the claim of the petitioners since similar steps had been taken against illegal encroachment belonging to other communities too. Again, it appeals to the Supreme Court to dismiss the petitions with a contention that the actions were in the bounds of legality and carried out without discrimination. The Supreme Court will consider the submissions and then pass judgment on whether demolitions violated its earlier directives. It is an important case because there is indeed cause for concern that legal processes are now being misused to target certain communities while, at the same time, raising real questions of balance between maintaining public order and citizens' rights. Probably, the judgment of the court will have greater implications on how state authorities deal with the encroachment problem and the powers they will exercise in executing these acts.
The Bombay High Court dismissed an appeal worth 31 million dollars filed by several insurance companies against an airport ground handling firm in a landmark judgment. The insurance cos filed for damages through the appeal after the commercial court ruled in favor of the ground handling firm. The Division Bench of the High Court agreed with the judgment pronounced by the commercial court. It held that it was not a case coming under the heads of commercial dispute, under the provisions of the Act on the Commercial Courts, 2015.The case was an appeal directed by the insurance companies to file a claim against the ground handling firm. In the claim filed against the ground handling firm, it had been alleged that due to negligence, it has caused such financial losses that the insurance companies prayed for damages in the amount of $31 million. The companies had insured those goods and services to be handled by the firm and insisted that the firm handled equipment improperly, which led to losses and therefore constituted their cause of liability to pay out on those insurance claims. This led the companies to recover loss from the ground handling company. But when the case first came to court, the commercial judge dismissed the suit. The said commercial court held that the dispute did not fall within the definition of "commercial dispute" contained in the Commercial Courts Act of 2015. The Act defines what falls within or what constitutes a commercial dispute, normally involving any disagreement concerning trade, commerce, or business contract. The court held that the dispute was more closely linked to an insurance claim and liability matter rather than a direct commercial or contractual dispute between businesses. Unhappy with the decision, the insurance companies appealed before the Bombay High Court, reasoning that the commercial court was wrong in dismissing the case and that the matter was essentially a commercial dispute. They said it involved sufficient money, as well as the nature of the relationship between the parties for it to be treated as a commercial dispute. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court refused to accept the submissions made by the insurance companies. The High Court agreed with the decision of the commercial court while handling the subject matter and held that the nature of the claim was not purely commercial within the meaning of the Act. It was held that the issue was an insurance claim and reimbursement which falls outside the purview of normal things that would be considered under the 2015 Act as constituting a commercial dispute. With this view, judgment of the court has far-reaching implications in that it sustains narrow view what is considered to fall under the description of a commercial dispute for the purposes of the Commercial Courts Act so that by definition, this act cannot be misapplied to insurance claims and other non-commercial legal matters. A ruling of such importance is that it emphasizes the point that the provisions of courts dedicated to commercial affairs, like commercial courts, can be invoked only after proper understanding and legal deliberation. From the judgment, the insurance companies cannot pursue their $31 million claim further under the Commercial Courts Act; however, they can consider other legal options.
In a profound departure from the traditional norms the new Lady Justice statue installed at the Supreme Court of India does away with the blindfold. This bold statement asserts that the law in India is not blind but rather aware of issues in society. Traditionally, Lady Justice, or 'Justitia,' dresses in a white robe and bears scales in one hand and a sword in the other, wearing a blindfold encasing her face. Or does it? This time, the non-wearing of the blindfold conveys another message — conscious judicial awareness of justice's complexities in India.Much debated and talked-about statue, it brings out an altogether new vision for justice in this country. The absence of the blindfold in India is perhaps an attempt to recognize the fact that justice cannot be blind to the inequalities and challenges present in society, a situation with which judicial processes have evolved dealing. The idea is to enhance that law has to be contextual and fair, especially in this very diverse nation of India, wherein judicial outcomes should be sensitive to the cultural and social fabric of the country. The statue, designed by a sculptor from Jaipur, is 8 feet tall and symbolic of strength, dynamism, and awareness. It holds the scales of justice, which stand for balance and fairness, and the sword, symbolising the fulfillment and execution of justice-but there is no blindfold. This change gives an implication that the judiciary cannot be insensitive to the subtleties involved in the cases before it, even more so in a country like India, where systemic problems like inequality, casteism, and corruption cannot be ignored while meting out justice. A statue unveiling of this nature comes at a time when the Indian judiciary is almost always criticized for striking the balance so aptly between legal precedence and social justice. The inability to observe the blindfold by many is seen as the Indian judiciary's willingness to be more amenable, progressive, and conscious of real-world contexts. But while some purists would hold that the blindfold is an essential element in ensuring the severeness of neutrality, this change seems rather deliberate in moving toward embracing a more engaged form of justice. In this bold move, the Supreme Court of India tries to send the message that though the law is unbiased, it cannot afford to be removed from the realities of society it serves. The new Lady Justice sculpture represents a judicial system that is awake to its challenges and has a readiness to ensure justice in an emerging world.
Tired of the financial distress commonly found amongst junior advocates, the Bar Council of India has recommended a stipend to newly enrolled lawyers at a monthly basis. Junior advocates practicing in urban areas would get a stipend of Rs 20,000, whereas those practicing in rural areas would get Rs 15,000 as the stipend. It's an important move toward the empowerment of young lawyers who shouldn't face any sort of financial crises at such an early stage of their careers.The BCI's proposal comes in acknowledgement of the hardships faced by junior advocates, especially in the early years when they usually go through financial strain due to the absence of a regular income. Many younger lawyers rely heavily on senior lawyers for funding or must find other jobs to support themselves, which eventually shifts focus away from actual legal practice. The BCI initiative provides a stipend so that the financial burden is somewhat alleviated for the young advocates to focus on the development of their skills and experience. This initiative received huge support from the legal fraternity: several senior advocates and law scholars appreciated the fact that BCI finally addressed the long-standing issue. There is general agreement that lawyers usually need years of experience before they can establish a strong foundation for themselves. The stipend would give an easy respite from the financial crisis and attract more and more young law graduates to pursue litigation instead of going after corporate jobs or alternative careers in law that promise better financial security. BCI Chairman Manan Kumar Mishra reiterated that the purpose of the proposed reduction in the scale of fees is to prevent trainee lawyers, and young lawyers especially belonging to financially disadvantaged sections, from getting scared away from the profession because of fee-charging. Mishra was also of the opinion that whereas senior lawyers and law firms do hefty business, leaves the junior advocates coping with losses. The stipend would be a kind of buffer during the first years as young advocates could be left to perform their duties and have time to actualize their dreams. But the implementation of this proposal will require cooperation from the respective state bar councils and financial contributions from both the central and state governments. Moreover, part of the funds may be drawn from the Advocates' Welfare Fund that was created to help legal professionals in distress. The implementation date of the stipend scheme has not been mentioned, but it is a recommendation through which, it is deemed, is a crucial stride towards a better balanced India. It is the intent of the BCI that under an economical umbrella, young junior advocates would develop a better environment to mature and sustain their careers in the practice of law.
A recent judgment by the Bombay High Court where Justice Bharati Dangre and Justice Manjusha Deshpande formed part of the bench, has quashed an FIR filed by her uncle's wife against Pragati Kapoor. From this case, she learns a very important legal principle related to the scope of cases that can be covered by the complaint brought under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.The Background of the Case The petitioner, Pragati Kapoor, had filed a plea before the Bombay High Court seeking the quashing of FIR lodged against her by her uncle's wife alleging domestic violence. Pragati is the niece of Manishchandra Kapoor and is accused of abetting her uncle to harass his wife. The case was filed under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, besides provisions of the Domestic Violence Act that include family members in its purview for actions of physical, emotional, and mental harassment. Key Arguments Counsels for Pragati Kapoor pleaded that the FIR filed against her was devoid of substance and hence legally not sustainable. She canvassed that neither did she live with this couple nor was she directly involved in their domestic affairs. The contention is that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act applies only to direct participants in the domestic environment of the aggrieved woman. According to the petitioner, such a proceeding was an abuse because the FIR sought to extend the provisions relating to domestic violence to include the class of people who do not fall within the domestic setup. Her counsel claimed that such cases would have dealt only with those having a domestic relationship with one another, such as closely related family members living in the same house, rather than involving distant relatives like a niece. The observations of the Court and Judgement After hearing the arguments, the bench agreed with the defense that petitioner's inclusion in the FIR was not justified. The court observed that under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, a "domestic relationship" becomes a vital factor defining the boundary of those who could be implicated. Domestic relationship would relate to relationships where parties are living in a shared household and have family ties based on marriage, adoption, or blood relations. Justice Dangre and Justice Deshpande held that the niece, Pragati Kapoor, who neither stayed with the couple nor had any important affairs to do with them in their daily life, would not be bringable under the Domestic Violence Act. The court also observed that bringing relative or other legal more and more to the extent of the claim for domestic violence would become easy misuse of the laws.
In a recent observation, the Supreme Court of India suggested the need for distinct arrest norms for what it referred to as parasites in society. This case has thrown open some serious questions relating to the constitutionality and acceptability of handcuffing during arrests as well as the treatment meted out towards the accused persons in society, particularly within the framework of criminal law and human rights. Background Case The case originated from a petition challenging the general practice of using handcuffs during arrests under the provision of the BNSS. The argument of the petitioner is that handcuffing persons, especially in non-violent or minor offenses, is a deprivation of their rights to dignity and right to being presumed innocent till proven otherwise. As a matter of fact, BNSS vests law-enforcing agencies with special powers, particularly as regards arrest and procedures surrounding offenses concerning excise violations. The petitioner pleaded for the Supreme Court to step in to standardize the usage of handcuffs and introduce guidelines so that these powers do not reach abuses. The case raised questions concerning the way the law dealt with classes of offenders, especially those who were termed habitual offenders or those that offended against societal interests. Observations of the Supreme Court Some notable comments come from the Supreme Court in the course of the hearing regarding the nature of crime and the mode of treatment of persons accused of committing various offenses. The bench made an observation saying that "parasites" in society—those perpetuators or person who commit crimes, or actions that cause serious harm to members of the public—call for different standards when it comes to arrests and handcuffing. It did not exactly state who would fall under the "parasites," but it seemed to distinguish between those who offend without harm and those whose activities are so harmful to society in a severe enough sense. However, it was also determined that not everyone arrested for a crime must be treated alike, and may even necessitate more stringent detention procedures such as handcuffs for serial offenders, or in circumstances in which there is a more serious endangerment to society at large. The right to dignity was therefore balanced with this perspective. No Notice Released Yet Although the Court did not issue a formal notice to the state authorities regarding the change of tack in the handcuff policy under the BNSS, it requested the petitioner to draw out an articulated compilation of best practices on arrest norms and the usage of handcuffs prevalent in different countries. This would help clarify for the Court, in general, how other countries deal with arrest protocols, including the usage of restraints like handcuffs. The Court also stated that such a compilation would go a long way in forming precedents about the future evolution of instructions regarding arrests by law enforcing authorities of India, specifically in regard to the offense committed by non-violent offenders. The Court had been keen to safeguard the interests of effective law enforcement on one hand, protect individual rights on the other and ensure that procedures did not break down human dignity. Implication of the Case Such arrest norms invite important Supreme Court observations on whether such treatment is fair or equitable. While the idea of treating habitual or dangerous offenders differently might appeal to some as a way of upholding public safety, it also stands the risk of creating a framework that might lead to arbitrary and discriminatory practices in the administration of justice. Further, the case raises broader issues of human rights in criminal justice, particularly on the use of force and restraint during an arrest. Human rights advocates have consistently argued that restraint by handcuffing should be used as little as necessary and only to prevent violence or flight, inasmuch as its indiscriminate use leads to degrading and dehumanizing treatment.
The Court inquired if such reservation had been given to the community by the Jammu & Kashmir government as a result of the judgment that the Supreme Court recently passed with regard to NALSA vs. Union of India judgment in two Public Interest Litigations filed in the interest and for the welfare of the community of transgendered individualsCase Background The two PILs, filed by social activists, further strengthened the demand for absolute recognition and protection of the rights of transgender people in the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Arguing that despite the NALSA judgment of 2014, where it had been pronounced that transgender persons be considered as the "third gender" and must be granted education, employment, and other constitutional rights, the community of Jammu & Kashmir has been largely unattended. The petitions have sought tangible steps such as reservations in jobs as well as in educational institutions towards promoting and integrating the transgender community in society. Judgement of the Court The bench of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court while providing an answer to the case has raised eyebrows over the lack of the Union Territory government's clear policies or schemes regarding the need for reservation for transgender people in the Union Territory. The Court, however wanted a categorical response from the government on whether it had taken any measures in this regard, in terms of directives of the Supreme Court. The NALSA judgment had reflected a gender right to self-identify and had also directed both the central and state governments that the transgender persons should be treated as socially and economically backward classes; they should be entitled to reservations in education and public employment. Government's Stand The counsel for the Jammu & Kashmir administration responded that the government had taken measures for the welfare of transgender people, but the Court felt such measures were indistinguishable and without particular reservations. The Court recalled that general welfare schemes could be in existence, but they are quite inadequate to fill the targeted reservations that are warranted to raise the transgender community as promised by the NALSA ruling. Future Implications It has directed the Jammu & Kashmir government to draft a detailed affidavit on the existing or proposed reservation policies concerning the transgender community. It shall base the future rights of the transgender community with proper representation in both the employment sectors and education sectors of the public sphere. This case also puts into focus the need for a legal framework more potent enough to protect the rights of the marginalized communities in this region. The date for the next hearing is later this year. All eyes are glued to the response of the government, which can set the precedent for transgender rights in other Union Territories and states across India..
In an era-defining judgment, Supreme Court of India ruled that a marriage performed through garlanding each other in a lawyer's chamber without any form of ceremony is legally valid. It is based on a case examined by a court in relation to the essential ingredients of a valid marriage under Indian law, from time to time, particularly under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The court of law pointed out that the intended marriage is more of an obsession than the function of a traditional marriage ceremony itself.Background Case In this case, the couple was involved and without the routine excitement of marriage in the Indian-style climate, they exchanged garlands and vows in the chamber of a lawyer. They subsequently lived as husband and wife but soon encountered some problems on which they engaged into legal battles for litigation where one of the parties challenged the validity of their marriage. The question before the Supreme Court was whether such an informal ceremony could be considered a legally valid marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act. Court Judgment The Supreme Court, while interpreting, referred to Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which indicates what kind of ceremonies must take place for a Hindu marriage. The Act says that Hindu marriages can be solemnized following customary rites and ceremonies. One rite that can be easily identified under Hindu law is Saptapadi-the taking of seven steps around the sacred fire. The court recognized the diversity in customs around India, and what makes a marriage may vary significantly with the regions and practices.While ancient rituals like Saptapadi are considered being performed in most cases, it is not at all obligatory that these have to be performed if there existed other customs that declare their consensus to undergo marriage. Legal Implications This judgment is reinforcing the principle that marriage is basically a social and legal organization essentially revolving around the intent and consent of both parties to the marriage. This judgment focuses on the fact that marriage does not get disqualified on the basis of the lack of elaborate rituals if the actions of the couples indicate a clear intention to marry. The decisions conclude the court rules "admit formal marriage only to the extent that it contains elements such as consent rather than conformity with strict ceremonial traditions".